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Cui Bono? Who Leaked the Harassment Committee’s Conclusions?

17. March 2023 · 23 comments · Categories: Democracy, Governance, Legal affairs, Politics

TWO YEARS AGO

Two years ago, on 18 March 2021, the Committee on the Scottish Government Handling of Harassment Complaints (the Committee) met for the final time and signed off its Final Report which was published on 23 March 2021.

The day is infamous due to the leaking of some of the Committee’s conclusions before it had even completed its deliberations. At 18:58, James Mathews from Sky News reported the Committee’s conclusions in a tweet and live on air.

Later that evening, the First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, who was one of those whose actions were under investigation, accused me and my opposition colleagues of having made our minds up before she gave evidence and claimed that we were responsible for the leak.

“What’s been clear is that opposition members of this committee made their minds up about me before I muttered a single word of evidence. Their public comments have made that clear. So this leak from the committee – very partisan leak – tonight before they’ve finalised the report is not that surprising.”

The next day, three of the four SNP members of the Committee (Alasdair Allan, Maureen Watt and Stuart McMillan) issued a media statement accusing me and my opposition colleagues of having ”railroaded though their prejudiced assertions based purely on political considerations,” and alleging that, “for the opposition, this was never about the truth. It was never about the evidence and, shamefully, it was never even about the women. All of these are being sacrificed in pursuit of political ends.”

I remain hurt and angry at having these false allegations made against me but chose to let matters rest at the time. Clearly the First Minister and her colleagues were determined to pin the blame for the leak on us and it was futile to engage in an ongoing war of words over the matter.

This blog seeks to determine who was responsible for the leaking of this information.

I am certain of the following:

I do not know how the Committee’s conclusions found their way into the hands of Sky News;
I know that I was not responsible;
I am confident that no member of the Committee leaked the conclusions directly to James Matthews.

CUI BONO?

In this blog, I ask cui bono? Who benefits?

This famous principle suggests that the party most likely to benefit from the leak is probably responsible for it.

What follows is first of all a report of the complaints made to the Ethical Standards Commissioner in the aftermath of the Committee’s work, then a chronology of the events leading up to the leak, and finally an analysis of who stood to gain from the leak.

COMPLAINTS

In October 2021, I received a letter from the Ethical Standards Commissioner containing over 50 complaints from individuals that I and other colleagues had breached the MSP Code of Conduct in two ways. The first (Category D complaints) was that I had openly discussed information in the public domain that was confidential to the Committee. The second (Category E complaints) was that I had leaked information (directly or indirectly) to the media that was confidential to the Committee. These latter complaints related to the 18 March leak to Sky News. None of the complainers to my knowledge claimed to have any evidence of any of the complaints that they were making.

The Commissioner used his statutory powers to require that all texts, emails and other information relating to any contact with named media outlets be handed over to him.

In May 2022, the Commissioner wrote to me to say that he had dismissed as inadmissible all of the Category D complaints.

On 6 September 2022, the Commissioner wrote to me to advise that he had concluded his investigation and had dismissed all of the Category E complaints that I had leaked confidential information to the media. Having assessed all interactions between Committee members and the media and related parties, he found no evidence to support the complaints.

However, he went on to say that he had sought legal advice on the possibility of obtaining information on the source of the leak from political parties and media outlets but that there were no reasonable prospects of success were he able to pursue such a course of action. This is not surprising in relation to the media where the protection of sources is a well established principle. But it is an intriguing claim in relation to political parties, given the powers in Section 13 of the Act which allow the Commissioner to compel the production of evidence from almost any person. Failure to do so is a criminal offence (Section 15 of the Act).

In any event, this particular investigation was over – as was another one initiated by myself.

I had long felt that the statement issued by the three SNP MSPs was defamatory and in breach of the MSP Code of Conduct (see end of this blog for full text of their statement). In particular the Code makes clear that MSPs must not provide the media with any comments on Committee reports until they are published.

I did not have the energy nor the presence of mind at the time to make a complaint. I was furious at them for their slurs but wanted to leave the whole sorry saga behind me. But on the first anniversary of the leak, I felt it was time to hold them to account for what I considered to have been a flagrant breach of the Code of Conduct and so on 20 March 2022, I made my own complaint to the Commissioner about their actions.

On the same day that complaints against me were dismissed (22 September 2022), the Commissioner wrote to me to rule that he had dismissed my own complaint against the three SNP MSPs. He did so on the basis that because the conclusions of the Committee were in the public domain as a result of the Sky News report, they could no longer be considered confidential and so were not covered by the confidentiality provisions of the Code of Conduct.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE LEAK

WEDNESDAY 17 MARCH 2021

The Committee’s inquiry was broken down into four strands of work, namely

The development of the (harassment complaints) procedure
How the complaints were handled
The judicial review of the process
The Scottish Ministerial Code

The Committee agreed early on to present conclusions on all four of these strands.

Over many meetings in February and March 2021, the Committee considered drafts of the Final Report. By 17 March 2021, we had not yet agreed the section of the report on the Ministerial Code. We had agreed that we would not come to any conclusions on whether the First Minister had breached the Ministerial Code. This was the subject of a separate investigation by the Independent Advisor on the Ministerial Code, Mr James Hamilton. However as the Committee’s report makes clear:

653. Mr Hamilton will gather his own evidence and reach his own conclusions in his own report. He will do so independently of this Committee and he is not obliged to take into account any conclusions we reach. Nor do we think it would be appropriate for us to seek to direct Mr Hamilton’s work or influence his own conclusions.

654. However, it remains the case that the Ministerial Code is also in our remit. We have conducted our own evidence taking on this subject. We consider it important that we report to the Parliament on the Ministerial Code in order to fulfil our remit.

By 17 March 2021, we still had no draft conclusions on the Ministerial Code strand.

At 09:53 on the Wednesday, the Clerk sent an email to Committee members with an attachment containing some suggested amendments from three members of the Committee. None were drafted in the form of actual text that could be added to the report but were instead arguments about why we should say one thing or another.

Later that evening, a final draft report for discussion the next day was circulated. I was of the view that the Ministerial Code conclusions were weak. Clerks clearly felt reluctant to go too far in their suggested text as this was undoubtedly the most politically sensitive part of the report’s conclusions.

And so I began drafting some conclusions on the Ministerial Code together with some wider reflections. I sent these to the Clerk at 22:14 that evening and they were circulated the next morning to Committee members at 08:12.

THURSDAY 18 MARCH 2021

On 18 March 2021, the Committee met for the last time to debate and agree its Report. It met from 09:00 – 12:16, 13:38 – 14:30 and 18:29 – 19:35. All meetings were held virtually.

My proposed text came up for discussion shortly after 14:00 and was the subject of some heated debate, with SNP members very unhappy with the draft but having proposed no alternative texts of their own. I offered to take the text away and redraft it to take account of views that had been expressed. I sent a final draft with some modest amendments to the Clerks and it was circulated to MSPs at 16:31.

We reconvened again at 18:29. We had the Ministerial Code, Overall Conclusions and Wider Reflections texts still to agree. At around 18:45, I formally moved that we agree the text of the proposed conclusions to the Ministerial Code section (these ended up as paragraphs 717-721 in the Final Report). They were agreed by division.

Thirteen minutes later, at 18:58, James Matthews dropped his bombshell and reported the conclusions of the Ministerial Code section on twitter and on Sky News. The Committee was still meeting and the report was not due to be published until the following Tuesday. There was a fair degree of astonishment and anger. Stuart McMillan walked out of the virtual meeting.

OTHER LEAKS

This was not the only occasion when confidential material had ended up in the public domain. The weekend after the Sky News leak, confidential evidence from the two complainers, Ms A and Ms B, from whom the Committee had taken evidence earlier in the week on 15 March, appeared in the media. Members had been explicitly advised of the sensitive nature of the evidence we heard, of the potential for contempt of court and of the risks of breaching the agreement entered into between the Parliament and the complainers in relation to how their evidence would be heard and reported. Nevertheless, confidential material containing salacious detail ended up being briefed to The Sunday Times and printed on 21 March 2021.

In January and February 2021, the Committee was engaged in a protracted dispute with Mr Salmond about the publication of his evidence and arrangements for giving oral evidence. Mr Salmond’s legal representatives, Levy and McRae, chose to send various emails and evidence directly to Committee members rather than, as advised, directly to the Clerk of the Committee.

At 15:32 on the afternoon of 22 February 2021, David McKie of Levy and McRae, wrote to the Committee to report that his client (Mr Salmond) had just been approached by media representatives who advised him that the First Minister had organised a media interview at 4 p.m. to “rebut our client’s latest submissions to the Committee.” These submissions had been sent to the Committee on 17 February but were not published until after 19:00 on 22 February. Whether the First Minister’s media interview was in fact in response to Mr Salmond’s latest submissions or alternatively in response to the briefings that Mr Salmond’s team had themselves been providing to the media, I cannot say. But if it was the former, and she had sight of his written submissions, then clearly someone had leaked them.

CUI BONO?

The sources of leaks are seldom found. I still do not know how some of the Committee’s conclusions ended up being broadcast by Sky News ten minutes after we agreed them. But I can say something about the likely culprits.

Leaks typically occur when the person leaking considers that either they have something to gain from the leak or that it is in the public interest for information to be publicised. People do not leak confidential documents on a whim. It is a risky venture and tends only to be done when the stakes are high and when there is a clear rationale for doing so.

First of all it is important to note that James Matthews must had had the draft conclusions well before 18:58. It is inconceivable that whoever leaked them did so at 18:45, that James Matthews managed to assure himself of the authenticity of the documents and organise an outside broadcast live on TV all within 13 minutes. As we will see, I think there was contact with Mr. Matthews in that time window but it was not the first contact that had been made.

The first draft conclusions on the topic of breaching the Ministerial Code were circulated to the Committee at 08:12 on Thursday. The draft conclusions that James Matthews reported were circulated at 16:31. We voted on them at 18:45 and they were then revealed on Sky News at 18:58. Whoever leaked them must have provided them to James Matthews well before 18:45.

It is worth noting as well that the meetings held on the Thursday were all virtual. Anyone could have been present with any of the MSPs hearing the Committee’s deliberations.

So who leaked the document?

As I argued at the outset, I am quite certain that none of the MSPs on the Committee leaked it directly to James Matthews. This would have been highly risky and without any evident purpose. The report would be published the following Tuesday after the verdict from James Hamilton and two days before Parliament went into recess for the May election. The report would, in presentational terms, be the last word.

To the extent that any opposition party MSP considered that there was any political advantage to them from the conclusions, they just had to wait just over four days. In any event, if they thought that the press should see them before Tuesday, they would, given the sensitivity of the leak, consult their own media teams and leaders. Even then, if there was any partisan gain to be had, the Sunday newspapers were the obvious channel for any such leak. There was one party for whom there was an evident benefit in leaking the conclusions, however.

Whilst not at first appearing to be of benefit to the First Minister, the leaking of the conclusions could be used by the First Minister’s political operatives as the precursor to the fury and condemnation directed at the Committee and effectively neuter the impact of the final report when it landed on Tuesday. It was a high risk strategy but there was little to lose. The Committee’s recommendations would have to be dealt with one way or another on the following Tuesday. James Hamilton’s report was due on Monday.

There was a channel of communication from the Committee that had been revealing confidential material for some months. I spoke to two political journalists, both of whom claimed that they received briefings from Scottish Government Special Advisers (SPADs) at various points during the inquiry. Much of the content of these briefings was spin on oral and written evidence that was in the public domain, but on a number of occasions it concerned details about process and evidence that was not in the public domain. Such information had to have come from the Committee, but neither myself, nor Liberal Democrat, Labour or Conservative MSPs were in the habit of briefing SPADs.

All of which leads me to conclude that it was the SNP which stood to benefit from the leak, as it provided an excuse to trash the Committee, its opposition members and, by extension its report and conclusions.

SO WHAT HAPPENED?

Here’s my best assessment.

The briefing provided to journalists by SPADs came from information supplied to them by an SNP member of the Committee. At some point on Thursday after 08:12 when the first draft was circulated, a SPAD was provided with the draft conclusions. They were perhaps emailed or perhaps the SPAD was present with the member at what was a virtual meeting.

Either way, the Government needed to know as soon as possible what was going to hit them on Tuesday and the job of the SNP member was to provide advance warning of what was to come.

During Thursday, a plan was devised that, for reasons of plausible deniability, was never shared beyond a very small circle of advisers and certainly not with the First Minister, who could not be seen to be part of the operation and who needed to be able to react with genuine surprise and fury at the leak.

Advisers got hold of the early 08:12 draft and decided that it should be leaked. This would not be the first time that James Matthews had been given stories by sources close to the First Minister that were damaging to Mr. Salmond. James Matthews was offered the exclusive. But SPADs and Mr. Matthews had to wait until the Committee had voted on the the text. After 16:00, it would be clear that the Committee was going to divide on the text and that it would pass by a majority. James Matthews got organised and ready to go on air at a moment’s notice. Shortly after 18:45, when the vote took place, he was given the all-clear to broadcast the text.

THE FURY

After James Matthews had dropped his bombshell, the journalist, who was known for his assertive interviewing style, waited for Nicola Sturgeon at her home. This is unusual. Journalists by convention do not doorstep the First Minister at her home unless there is a major news story breaking involving her – which there was. James Matthews was the only journalist there. Was he there on his own initiative or had he been tipped off?

The First Minister accused me and other MSPs of being partisan and having made up our minds before hearing her evidence.

This was followed the next day by Alasdair Allan, Maureen Watt and Stuart McMillan, with their faux outrage and accusations, trashing the committee’s reputation. Social media was awash with condemnation of myself and my opposition colleagues. The narrative was established that we were partisan and had debased Parliament by leaking sensitive information.

The First Minister’s spokesperson released a statement questioning the integrity of the Committee’s members (presumably excluding the SNP members, though at this stage that hardly needed saying), accusing us of “baseless assertion, supposition and smear”. The irony of this last accusation was clearly been lost on whoever wrote the statement.

Spin doctors held private briefings with journalists to try to undermine my personal integrity in particular.

Meanwhile, I responded to over a dozen queries from journalists about the authenticity of the leak, by saying that I was barred from commenting until the report was published.

How naive of me.

To cap it all, the leak of Ms A’s and Ms B’s evidence on the Sunday amplified this narrative a hundred-fold, with further accusations of bad faith and betrayal by us.

The plan was a success. The reputation of myself and my opposition colleagues was in the gutter. Un-evidenced claims that one of us had been the source of the leak became alleged established fact.

The Committee’s reputation was in tatters and its conclusions derided.

AFTERMATH

We still do not know who was responsible for this leak. But it is notable that the Ethical Standards Commissioner wanted to interview political parties but for, following legal advice, concluded that he couldn’t..

I have said nothing about the leak of Ms A’s and Ms B’s evidence, but cui bono?

Finally, the MSP Code of Conduct is not fit for purpose. It is now abundantly clear that any MSP can, for malign motives, leak Committee reports and, indeed, any other confidential information.

They can then conduct a systematic demolition job on the Committee’s conclusions, since the rules on confidentiality no longer apply.

Meanwhile mugs like me follow the spirit of the rules and make no comment. I shall be writing to the Presiding Officer on the matter.

Thanks for reading.

——————————————————————————————————-

Statement by Alasdair Allan, Maureen Watt and Stuart McMillan

STATEMENT FROM MSP [sic] MEMBERS OF SGHHC COMMITTEE

“This Committee was meant to carry out a dispassionate search for the truth.

But, at the very last minute, without full consideration of the evidence, the opposition railroaded through their prejudged assertions based purely on political considerations.

On the question of the First Minister offering to intervene, there are two sides of the story and we have evidence from both sides, but opposition MSPs chose not to reflect that by selectively referencing only the evidence which supported their preconceived narrative.

We have also heard clear, consistent evidence that the First Minister had no knowledge of concerns of inappropriate sexual behaviour by Alex Salmond before November 2017.

Yet, without a shred of evidence to the contrary, the opposition simply used their majority on the committee to insert 11th-hour predetermined political assertions that have no basis in fact. That is simply disgraceful and wrong.

For the opposition, this was never about the truth. It was never about the evidence and, shamefully, it was never even about the women. All of these are being sacrificed in pursuit of political ends.

This is the politics of desperation by the opposition members.”

Alasdair Allan
Maureen Watt
Stuart McMillan

Note:

We the above Members release this joint statement to address issues raised by the leaking of information – in blatant contravention of the MSP code – relating to the unfinished and unpublished report from the Committee on the Scottish Government Handling of Harassment Complaints.

We have previously refused to give a running commentary on the Committee’s work but media speculation has compelled us to comment solely on accounts recently placed in the public domain and we will not comment further until the full report is published.

Declaration of Interests, Income and Tax 2016-17

29. January 2018 · Comments Off · Categories: Announcements, Freedom of Information, Governance

Since 2010, I have been (like a couple of my self-employed writer/activist colleagues George Monbiot and Alastair McIntosh) making an annual declaration of interests, income and tax. Previous declarations can be found at the foot of the About page.

Commentators, campaigners and advocacy groups should be open about their interests and income (this story from earlier in 2014 is a good example of why I believe this to be so). I also believe that we have too much secrecy in the UK on matters of income and wealth and that if everyone’s income was openly declared, there would be much less inequality. This is not an especially radical idea. In Norway, details of every citizen’s income, assets and the tax they pay are available to the public and published on this website.

As a member of the Scottish Green Party, I also feel obliged to comply with the policy resolution passed at the 2011 Conference on Tax Evasion and Avoidance which encourages corporations and individuals to not use tax havens and to publish their accounts on a country by country basis.

In 2016 I was elected as an MSP. I will continue to publish information in this format on an annual basis but have also published a transparency page on my MSP website to draw attention to wider transparency issues in relation to my public role.

2016-17 INCOME
I am an MSP. My tax return for 2016-17 also includes earnings from writing, research, consultancy, public speaking, investigation, and subscriptions from the whoownsscotland website. My accounting year is the calendar year and so for my tax return of April 2017, it is 2016. During 2016, I earned income from self-employment principally from January to May and following the election, from work completed prior to May but not invoiced until afterwards.

For 2016-17, my income was as follows.

MSP SALARY (1) £ 48,782
BENEFITS & EXPENSES £ 1,979
PROFIT SELF-EMPLOYED (2) £ 11,744
DIVIDENDS £ 404
TOTAL INCOME (3) £ 62,909

My total taxable income for the Year Ending 5 April 2017 was £ 62.909 on which I am due to pay tax of £12.906 and Class 4 NI contributions of £331.56 = total of £13,237.56 (see tax HMRC calculation here).

During 2016 all of my self-employed income was generated from within the UK. My main clients were NGOs, private companies, law firms, print & broadcast media and royalty payments on my books.

DECLARATION OF INTERESTS 1 JANUARY 2018
I own no land or property.
I have 483 shares in Standard Life.
I am on the Board of Directors of the Caledonia Centre for Social Development (Company No. 192099 & Scottish Charity No. SC 028485).
I am a member of the Scottish Green Party and a number of charitable bodies.
I do not make use of any tax havens or artificial accounting structures to conceal my income

Also see my Parliamentary Register of Interests

NOTES
(1) MSP Salary is 5 May 2016 – 5 April 2017. The sum is derived from P60 after deduction of pension contributions.
(2) Gross Income less outlays & expenses – computers, travel, stationery, telephone, research fees (for example, search fees paid to Registers of Scotland) and other expenses of employment.

Declaration of Interests, Income and Tax 2015

27. January 2017 · Comments Off · Categories: Announcements, Freedom of Information, Governance

In 2016 I was elected as an MSP. I will continue to publish information in this format on an annual basis but will also include a transparency page on my MSP website to draw attention to wider transparency issues in relation to my public role.

2015 INCOME
I earn my living from writing, research, consultancy, public speaking, investigation, and subscriptions from the whoownsscotland website. My accounting year is the calendar year and so for my tax return of April 2016, it is 2015. For 2015, my income was as follows.

GROSS INCOME (1) £ 42,323
LESS COSTS (2) £ 11,130
TAXABLE INCOME (3) £ 31,193

My total taxable income (including bank interest & dividends) for the Year Ending 5 April 2016 was £ 33,582 on which I am due to pay tax of £4121 and Class 4 NI contributions of £2082 = total of £6203 (see tax HMRC calculation here).

During 2015 all of my income was generated from within the UK. My main clients were NGOs, private companies, law firms, print & broadcast media and royalty payments on my books.

DECLARATION OF INTERESTS 1 JANUARY 2017
I own no land or property.
I have 483 shares in Standard Life (legally I have 2453 but 1970 are held on behalf of a minor)
I am on the Board of Directors of the Caledonia Centre for Social Development (Company No. 192099 & Scottish Charity No. SC 028485).
I am a member of the Scottish Green Party and a number of charitable bodies.
I do not make use of any tax havens or artificial accounting structures to conceal my income

Also see my Parliamentary Register of Interests

NOTES
(1) Gross Income is total of all income received. This includes re-imbursment for travel costs etc.
(2) Costs are all expenses such as computers, travel, stationery, telephone, research fees (for example, search fees paid to Registers of Scotland) and other expenses of employment.
(3) Taxable income is Gross Income less expenses and is the profit on which tax is calculated.

Declaration of Interests, Income and Tax 2014

22. January 2016 · Comments Off · Categories: Announcements, Freedom of Information, Governance

2014 INCOME

I earn my living from writing, research, consultancy, public speaking, investigation, and subscriptions from the whoownsscotland website. For 2014, my income was as follows.

GROSS INCOME (1) £ 38,047

LESS COSTS (2) £ 8324

TAXABLE INCOME (3) £ 29,722

My total taxable income (including bank interest & dividends) was £30,173 on which I am due to pay tax of £3947 and Class 4 NI contributions of £1958 = total of £5905 (see tax HMRC calculation here)

During 2014 all of my income was generated from within the UK. My main clients were NGOs, private companies, law firms, print & broadcast media and royalty payments on my books.

DECLARATION OF INTERESTS 1 JANUARY 2016

I own no land or property.

I have 483 shares in Standard Life.

I am on the Board of Directors of the Caledonia Centre for Social Development (Company No. 192099 & Scottish Charity No. SC 028485).

I am a member of the Scottish Green Party and a number of charitable bodies.

I do not make use of any tax havens or artificial accounting structures to conceal my income

NOTES

(1) Gross Income is the total of all income received. This includes re-imbursment for travel costs etc.

(2) Costs are all expenses such as computers, travel, stationery, telephone, research fees (for example, search fees paid to Registers of Scotland) and other expenses of employment.

(3) Taxable income is Gross Income minus expenses and is the profit figure on which tax is calculated.

The Scotland Bill & the Crown Estate (2)

21. June 2015 · 22 comments · Categories: Crown Estate, Democracy, Governance, Land Reform, Legal affairs, Politics

The provisions in the Scotland Bill for the devolution of the management of the Crown Estate in Scotland are complex and unclear (see previous blog for background).

Last week, the Scottish Parliament’s Rural Affairs, Climate Change and Environment Committee (RACCE) heard evidence from representatives of the Crown Estate Commissioners (CEC) and some significant points came up. (1) Here are my latest thoughts on why Clause 31 of the Scotland Bill fails to implement the Smith Agreement on this topic.

In 1999, Crown property rights were devolved under the Scotland Act 1998. However, the management and revenues were reserved and remained under the control of the CEC. The Smith Agreement is to devolve the management and the revenues. To achieve this is straightforward. The two reservations (of management and of revenues) in Schedule 5 of the 1998 Act need to be removed.

Once these removals take effect, the responsibility for the management and revenues of the Scottish Crown property, rights and interests that currently make up the Crown Estate in Scotland would fall by default to the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government. While Scottish Ministers would need to put in place the necessary administrative arrangements to deal with these new responsibilities, there is no need for any further legislation. Once this has happened, the Scottish Parliament can begin the process of decentralisation (to which all political parties are committed) and some of which will require legislation to put into effect.

In contrast with that approach, the Scotland Bill provides for a “transfer scheme” whereby functions of the CEC may be transferred to a transferee in Scotland and continue to be governed by a modified Crown Estate Act 1961, until such time as the Scottish Parliament determines otherwise. One of those giving evidence to RACCE was Rob Booth, the Head of Legal at the CEC. He said, in response to a question that,

“The position after the transfer date will be that the Crown Estate Act 1961 will be applied as a fallback, to fill a potential vacuum. At the transfer date, if no Scottish legislation has been brought forward to set up the structure to take on the new role, a modified version of the 1961 act will be applied as an interim measure until Scotland has had an opportunity to pass that legislation.

In my reading of the Scotland Bill, it is not anticipated that there will be an on-going application of those 1961 act principles to management in Scotland. After the transfer date, as things stand, the 1961 act will apply only to the Crown estate in the rest of the UK, so Scotland will have freedom as far that particular aspect is concerned.” (2)

In other words, the Scotland Bill would remove the Schedule 5 reservation on management (we will deal with revenues shortly) but rather than keeping things straightforward as outlined above, Clause 31 would put in place a Treasury transfer scheme which binds nominated transferees into a legal framework governed by the Crown Estate Act and which needs to be undone by the Scottish Parliament if and when it wishes to do so in relation to the various Crown property rights and interests involved.

It remains unclear why this added complexity is necessary. Four other aspects remain unclear.

The first is the question of the revenues. It is now clear that the Scotland Bill will not devolve the revenues. Instead, it amends the Civil List Act to the effect that all revenues will be paid to the Scottish Consolidated Fund. The reservation in Schedule 5 remains in place, however, and so it will be incompetent for the Scottish Parliament to make any change to this arrangement. This, in effect, makes decentralisation very problematic. The promise that the First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon made in Orkney two weeks ago, that “coastal and island councils will benefit from 100 per cent of the net revenue generated in their area from activities within 12 miles of the shore” is made rather difficult if all of the revenue has, by law, to flow to the Scottish Consolidated Fund. (3)

The second matter relates to the idea that, after devolution, the CEC will continue to be able to acquire land in Scotland. This is legally incompetent. The CEC does not acquire land or property interest in its own behalf but does so on behalf of the Crown. Constitutionally and legally, the Crown is a distinct entity in Scotland from the rest of the UK. Were the CEC to acquire, say a shopping centre in Scotland in 5 years time, it would be owned by the Crown in Scots law but acquired from revenue derived from the English Crown. Constitutional experts will be better placed to address this question than I but I do not think this is constitutionally possible.

Thirdly, the Scotland Bill at Clause 31(10) stipulates that any management of Crown property in Scotland shall maintain the property, rights and interests as “an estate in land”. Rob Booth described this as “a fundamental founding principle of the Crown Estate”. (4) But after devolution there will be no Crown Estate in Scotland (the term will only apply outside Scotland). Crown property rights have been devolved since 1999 and this constraint represents a reversal of the current competence of the Scottish Parliament for no good reason.

Finally, the Fort Kinnaird retail park in the east of Edinburgh will not be included in the devolved settlement. Rob Booth explained this in the following terms.

“As a lawyer reading the Smith proposals, I can see that Smith talked about Crown Estate economic assets in Scotland being devolved to Scottish ministers. There is a statutory definition in section 1(1) of the Crown Estate Act 1961 of what the Crown estate is, which is those assets that are managed by the Crown Estate Commissioners. Fort Kinnaird undoubtedly is an economic asset in Scotland, but we do not manage it. The underlying asset is not owned by the Crown; therefore, to my mind as a lawyer, it does not fit the definition of a Crown Estate economic asset in Scotland as described by the Smith report.” (5)

Fort Kinnaird is owned by a partnership – The Gibraltar Limited Partnership. In Scots law a partnership is a legal entity and may own property in its own right. The Gibraltar Partnership, however, is governed by English law, specifically the Limited Partnership Act of 1907. Such partnerships are not legal entities and it is the partners that are the legal owners of the property. There are two partners in the Partnership – the CEC on behalf of the Crown and the Hercules Unit Trust. Since Fort Kinnaird is in Scotland, the interest that the CEC has is an interest owned by the Scottish Crown. (6)

Rob Booth’s explanation is unconvincing, disingenuous and wrong. The underlying asset (the interest) is owned by the Crown, the CEC manages that interest, and it does therefore form part of the Crown Estate.

To conclude, the Scotland Bill does not implement the Smith Agreement. Instead it creates a complex and incoherent muddle where there should, instead, be clarity and simplicity. The Scotland Bill is about devolving further powers to the Scottish Parliament. That is achieved by removing the two key reservations. That’s all, in essence, that it needs to do (although there are minor consequential amendments) and it doesn’t even achieve that. In the Committee stage of the Bill on 29 June 2015, MPs should ensure that it does.

NOTES

(1) Official Report here
(2) Official Report Cols 12-13
(3) See Shetland Times, 21 June 2015
(4) Official Report Col 14
(5) Official Report Col 6
(6) See here for Companies House filing history on the Partnership

The Smith Commission, the Scotland Bill and the Crown Estate

11. June 2015 · 29 comments · Categories: Crown Estate, Democracy, Governance, Land Reform, Legal affairs, Politics

Introduction

One of the Smith Commission agreements was that responsibility for the management and revenues of the Crown Estate in Scotland should be devolved to the Scottish Parliament. (1)

This Agreement reflected the widespread consensus in Scotland that the management of the Crown Estate should be devolved. There have been several inquiries into this topic over the last ten years, from the Crown Estate Review Working Group (2007) to Westminster’s Scottish Affairs Committee (2012), which also recommended the devolution of the Crown Estate in Scotland. (2)

The Smith Commission also agreed, like the Scottish Affairs Committee before it, that devolution should be followed by further decentralisation to local authorities, communities and others, of responsibilities for the various Crown property, rights and interests that make up the Crown Estate in Scotland. Both the Scottish Affairs Committee and the Smith Commission were clear, however, that this decentralisation was to take place after the devolution of the management of the Crown Estate to the Scottish Parliament. (3)

The Scotland Bill was published on the 28th May by the UK Government and is now on its hurried passage through the UK Parliament. (4) It is intended to implement the Smith Commission agreements. Clause 31 of the Bill that deals with the Crown Estate, however, completely fails to do this and needs to be re-drafted.

But, first, some background.

The Crown Estate

The Crown Estate is the name given in the Crown Estate Act 1961 to the various Crown property, rights and interests that are managed by the Crown Estate Commissioners (CEC). The CEC is a statutory corporation first constituted by the Crown Estate Act 1956 and now operating under the 1961 Act. The CEC transfers its net surplus revenue or ‘profit’ each year to the UK Government’s Consolidated Fund for use in public expenditure. (5)

The CEC is thus the manager of property rights that belong to the Crown. However, there can often be confusion between the manager and the property, because the CEC has branded itself for its corporate identity as ‘The Crown Estate’. The Treasury Committee also felt it necessary to emphasise in its report on the Crown Estate, that “the CEC are a public body charged with managing public resources for public benefit”. (6)

The Crown property, rights and interests that make up the Crown Estate in Scotland are legally and constitutionally distinct from those in the rest of the UK, because they are owned by the Crown in Scotland and defined in Scots law. Scotland’s Crown property rights are of ancient origin and continued to be administered with their revenues in Scotland following the Union of Crowns in 1603 and the Treaty of Union in 1707. Some of these Crown rights continue to be managed in Scotland by the Scottish Government and Crown Office. However, the administration and revenues of many of Scotland’s Crown property rights were transferred from Edinburgh to a government department in London in the 1830s. That department and its successors, were the predecessors of the current CEC.

The Crown property rights managed by the CEC in Scotland include Scotland’s territorial seabed and Crown rights over the Scotland’s continental shelf zone (see map above), around half of Scotland’s foreshore, the right to mine gold, salmon fishings, four rural estates and two urban properties. The Crown Estate in Scotland only accounts for around 3-4% of the value attributed to the UK wide Crown Estate and revenue produced by it. The CEC’s annual ‘profit’ from its operations in Scotland, has been around £5m in recent years. (7)

The Scotland Act 1998 devolved legislative competence over Scots property law, including Crown property rights, to the Scottish Parliament. The first Scottish Parliament, for example, used this legislative authority to abolish the Crown’s ultimate ownership of land in Scotland under feudal tenure. However, the reservation of the management of the Crown Estate in the Scotland Act, precludes the Scottish Parliament from being able to legislate over the rights managed by the CEC and also means that the CEC is not accountable to either the Scottish Parliament and Government for its operations in Scotland. Implementing the Smith Agreement would complete the devolution process started in 1999 and bring the rights and the management together under the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament.

The Scotland Bill

The Smith Agreement to devolve the management and revenues of the Crown’s property rights should be straightforward to implement in legislation.

The two main requirements are to amend the Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 5 Part 1 by;

1. removing clause 2(3) that reserves the management of the Crown Estate in Scotland and,

2. removing clause 3(3)(a) that reserves the revenue from the Crown Estate in Scotland.

Removing these two reservations would mean that responsibility for managing the Crown property rights that currently make up the Crown Estate in Scotland, automatically falls to the Scottish Parliament.

Appropriate legislation also needs to cover some consequential amendments to other legislation, in particular to the Crown Estate Act 1961 to reflect that it would no longer apply in Scotland. In addition, the legislation requires some procedural provisions dealing with the transfer date and process.

Unfortunately, clause 31 in the Scotland Bill manifestly does not implement the Smith Agreement. The clause does not devolve the responsibility for the management of the Crown Estate in Scotland to the Scottish Parliament. Instead, the clause delegates existing functions of the CEC as a statutory corporation to Scottish Ministers or others transferees through a Treasury ‘scheme’.

The current clause 31 attempts to enable the CEC to continue to operate in Scotland and to bind those to whom functions are transferred to the restrictive terms of the Crown Estate Act 1961 under which the CEC operates. The clause’s provisions to try to achieve this are, as others have commented, complex and unclear. (8) They are a recipe for confusion and legal anomalies. They do not devolve legislative responsibility over the Crown property rights and revenues involved in Scotland to the Scottish Parliament and will frustrate the widespread consensus for the further decentralisation of these within Scotland. (9)

Re-framing Clause 31

The Smith Agreement to devolve responsibility over the Crown Estate in Scotland reflects the longstanding agreement in Scotland over this matter and it should be straightforward to implement through the Scotland Bill. Why then does the existing clause 31 fail to do this?

This blog argues that this current state of affairs has arisen because of the degree of influence that the CEC has had on the nature of clause 31. The sequence of Committee inquiries and reports into the operations of the CEC show how CEC corporate policies have been aimed at maintaining it as a UK organisation. IN 1998, the CEC declined to participate in the devolution process in the way that the Forestry Commissioners did (and have continued to do). The starkest example, however, was in 2001/02 when, against the flow of devolution, the CEC ended its management of the Crown Estate in Scotland as a separate management unit with its own manager and financial accounts, so that the CEC could assimilate its operations in Scotland into those in the rest of the UK. (10) The current clause 31 with its stretching and twisting of the Crown Estate Act 1961, can be seen as the CEC’s latest move to try to retain the Crown Estate as a UK wide estate.

Furthermore, it is distressing to note the continuing mis-understanding of what exactly the Smith Commission agreed. For example, a briefing issued by the Scottish Parliament, claims that it is the “powers of the Crown Estate Commissioners [which are set out in the 1961 Act] which would be transferred to Scottish Ministers.” (11)

This is wrong.

The Smith Agreement patently does not say this. It says that responsibility for management will be devolved to the Scottish Parliament. That is an entirely different matter from a mere delegation of functions to be exercised within the framework of continuing reserved powers.

The Scottish Government’s initial response to the Scotland Bill recognises the need to re-frame clause 31, so that the clause removes the reservations in the Scotland Act 1998 over the management and revenues of the Crown property rights in Scotland forming part of the Crown Estate. (12) The terms of the Scottish Government’s proposed alternative clause 31 still suffers from some other weaknesses. However, it is to be hoped that all the parties involved in the Smith Commission will recognise that the issues over clause 31 are not party political.

Solving this problem is a simple matter of re-framing the clause in a competent was so as to implement the Smith Agreement in as straightforward a manner as possible.

Smith Commission page 16
See Crown Estate Review Working Group Report and Scottish Affairs Committee Report.
See, for example, Lord Smith’s evidence to Scottish Affairs Committee 3 December 2014. Q137-Q140
Scotland Bill
Section 1(2) Civil List Act 1952
House of Commons Treasury Committee Report, 2010 para 10
Scottish Affairs Committee Report para 39
See Devolution (Further Powers) Committee report
For example, the Bill amends the Civil List Act 1952 to obligate the payment of all Crown revenues to the Scottish Consolidated Fund. Decentralisation to, for example, to harbour trusts will be constrained by a continuing legal constraint to hand over all revenues to the Scottish Government.
Scottish Affairs Committee Report para 21
See SPICE/Clerks/Legal Briefing page 15 “Provision has been made to amend the Crown Estate Act 1961 to reflect the new role for Scottish Ministers (SMs), but to retain the requirement to manage and improve etc the property, rights and interests being transferred subject to the remaining provisions of the Crown Estate Act 1961. This reflects the Smith Commission recommendation that it would be the powers of the Crown Estate Commissioners [which are set out in the 1961 Act] which would be transferred to Scottish Ministers.”
See Scottish Government alternative clause, pages 12-13 and 43

OTHER DOCUMENTS

House of Commons Library Briefing on Scotland Bill

Charities’ interests in land

01. February 2015 · 24 comments · Categories: Governance, Land Reform, Who Owns Scotland

Image: Map of Applecross Estate

Proposal 6 in the Scottish Government’s consultation paper on land reform (see link here) is to introduce a statutory duty of community engagement on charitable bodies that own land. There are four main types of charitable bodies that own land and property.

1. Environmental charities such as the National Trust for Scotland, Scottish Wildlife Trust and Royal Society for the Protection of Birds;

2. Educational bodies such as universities, colleges and private schools;

3. Community bodies that own anything from a village hall to large estates such as South Uist, Assynt and Knoydart; and

4. Landed estates formerly owned by private individuals that have been transferred into charitable company and trusts. These include estates of Applecross, Isle of Bute, Drummond Estate, much of Atholl Estate and Conchra Estate.

Environmental and community bodies have reacted to the proposal with irritation, claiming that they already engage with communities. Likewise with community bodies which already have membership open to all who live in the community and are run by boards of directors elected by the community.

In a blog on the Scottish Community Woodlands Association website, Jon Hollingdale makes the case that imposing such a duty across the board is an over-reaction to a problem which is quite modest in scale.

“If the issue is with the tiny cohort of private Scottish charities whose landholdings give them a local monopoly, then, rather than imposing general burdens on all, the smart answer is to take another look at the charitable status of these organisations.”

There are a number of charitable bodies that were set up by previous private owners (often for tax purposes) and which, today, own quite large landholdings. Typically, the membership is restricted to a fixed number and with special appointment rights in the hands of the former owner.

For example, the Mount Stuart Trust owns 23,800 acres of the Isle of Bute. It was set up by the 6th Marquess of Bute in 1985 as a charitable trust and incorporated as a company limited by guarantee with no share capital in May 1989.

Under Article 21.1.2 of the Articles of Association of the company, the Marquess of Bute has the power to appoint up to four Directors even though he himself is not a member, a tax-exile and non-resident in the UK.

The Applecross Estate extends to 61,600 acres in Wester Ross. It was bought by the Wills tobacco family in 1929 and is owned today by the Applecross Trust, a company limited by guarantee with no share capital. Back in 1978, the Wills family were worried about the impact of capital transfer tax and, to avoid exposure to it, decided to transfer the estate into a charitable body. As they noted in a letter to residents at the time,

It continues,

Copy of full letter here (2Mb pdf)

Today, the estate is still owned by the Trust and its membership is still associated with the Wills family, Richard Wills being the current Chair of the Board. None of the board members lives in Applecross.

In 2012, around 100 people applied as part of the Land Action Scotland campaign to become members of the two charities the, Mount Stuart Trust and Applecross Trust. All applications were refused. The Applecross Trust response is outlined here & a media report here.

Many local people in Applecross would like to become members of the Trust and play an active role in the management of the estate. The peninsular is very rural and has a fragile economy. Development to retain and create jobs is vital and yet the trust’s charitable objectives are restricted to preservation, environmental protection and amenity, public access and the advancement of education, arts, heritage, culture and science.

This makes it difficult, for example to develop housing since the charitable objectives do not include economic development and thus any sale of land has to be at open market value which is beyond the reach of most local people.

Meanwhile, the Chair, Mr Richard Wills, through a partnership of which he is a member (Deer Management Consultants), rents the deer stalking on the estate. The rent is negotiated on an independent basis with no involvement from Mr Wills. Similarly, Mr Wills rents Applecross House (pictured above) and fishings in the Applecross River for £10,200 per year from 2014-2029. When not at his country house in Applecross, Mr Wills lives in a large country house in Hampshire (pictured below)

Despite the independent arms length negotiation, it is open to question whether these rents represent the best that can be obtained on behalf of the charity in the market. Other similar country houses are available on estates in the region for between £2000 and £2800 per week. Applecross Estate rents the Applecross Manse (sleeps 7) for £1080 per week on the open holiday lets market.

The question raised by the consultation is whether these estates should continue to be owned and managed by charitable bodies that restrict membership to a few members of family and friends, provide exclusive nomination rights for tax-exiles such as the Marquess of Bute, but yet refuse to allow the beneficiaries of the charities – the local population – any right to become members or Directors of the respective company boards. The Applecross Trust even has a vacant on its Board following the resignation of Charles Peregrine Albermarle Bertie in December 2012. But it remains unfilled.

I think it is time to open up these closed shops, review their governance and allow the wider community to have the opportunity to have a stake in the future of their community.

Hjorteviltforvaltning i Norge

23. January 2015 · 11 comments · Categories: Environment, Governance, Land Reform, Land Use

In this article, entitled Hjorteviltforvaltning i Norge (Deer management in Norway), Dr. Duncan Halley and Dr. Erling Solberg of the Norwegian Institute for Nature Research describe the framework for deer management and wildlife management in Norway.

Dr. Duncan Halley was born and educated in Scotland. He moved to Norway in 1993, where he works on wildlife management, restoration ecology, and Scotland/Norway landscape management comparisons. Dr. Erling Solberg is a leading researcher on deer management in Norway and an active hunter. They are research ecologists at the Norwegian Institute for Nature Research (NINA), Norway’s leading applied ecology institute (www.nina.no). Contact: duncan.halley@nina.no

The Scottish Government’s proposed land reform bill contains a very modest proposal for improving the democratic accountability in relation to the management of this public resource by private interests. To achieve a wildlife management system fit for the 21st century, however, more fundamental reform is needed. The Norwegian experience offers some insight into what might be involved.

Guest Blog by Duncan Halley & Erling Solberg, Norwegian Institute for Nature Research

Land Reform legislation in 2015 will include strengthened powers to allow the authorities to regulate deer populations in Scotland. Further action is promised from 2016 if the current voluntary system “has not produced a step change in the delivery of effective deer management”.

It seems likely that action would follow the precedent set in the recent Wild Fisheries Review, where the remit was to:

“develop and promote a modern, evidence-based management system for wild fisheries fit for purpose in the 21st century, and capable of responding to the changing environment”;

and

“manage, conserve and develop our wild fisheries to maximise the sustainable benefit of Scotland’s wild fish resources to the country as a whole and particularly to rural areas”.

Here we present a brief look at what a modern system, functioning not far from Scotland, can look like. South West Norway is on the same latitude as Northern Scotland and is similar in landforms and climate – hilly to mountainous and highly oceanic. The deer resource in the region is mainly red and roe deer, though there are also some moose and reindeer. (1) Here we discuss the system as it applies to red and roe deer.

Landowners in Norway, as in Scotland, do not own the wildlife on their land but do own the hunting rights to game animals such as red and roe deer, and the carcasses that legal hunting produces. These rights can be, and in many cases are, sold.

Modern deer management in Norway is the result of development and refinement over many decades. The core of the system is a partnership of government, landowners, and hunters, each with a defined role. This is backed by professional wildlife management skills, monitoring of harvests and populations to provide high quality data for future management, and binding harvest management plans which regulate and maintain population levels of the national game resource in accordance with democratically accountable national, regional and local goals. This has included in some regions managed reductions in populations to ensure natural forest regeneration (which local and regional authorities are required to plan for, and landowners to achieve, see below).

The system has been effective in managing the resource at sustainable levels, which take into account wider environmental, social and economic interests. It enjoys broad public support.

The government has been keen to encourage a market for wild game meat. Food Safety Authority regulations for sale of meat on the open market by hunting rights owners, hunting teams, and/or individual hunters are simple and the system efficient. This has considerably expanded the market, to the benefit of hunting rights owners, hunters, and consumers.

Image: Hunting in Norway (Erling Solberg)

Who does what?

The Norwegian Environment Agency oversees the regulation of the system. It determines and finances research and monitoring requirements and determines the normal hunting seasons.

The Regional authorities (fylkeskommuner) are responsible for building management competence at local level among Municipalities (kommuner) and landowners, for guidance on population management at a regional level in accordance with wider societal goals such as biodiversity, prevention of overgrazing, and road safety; and for overseeing coordination among hunting rights owners and local councils to attain regional management goals. (2)

Municipalities (kommuner) have the authority and responsibility for managing local harvest levels in accordance with overall regional goals and with directing harvest levels at a local level with regard to minimizing conflicts with e.g. traffic safety, biodiversity, woodland regeneration, agriculture, and public enjoyment of nature. They issue the final harvest permits, can extend the usual hunting season, and must report permit levels and actual harvests to the National Deer Register. They may also report results of local monitoring. Section 9 of the Forest Law of 2005 mandates that Municipalities (kommuner) investigate deer damage to woodland regeneration and incorporate this in harvest management planning.

The owners of hunting rights are responsible for population regulation through a binding harvest plan for the hunting beat (vald), a defined area of land for which a named individual is responsible for relations with the authorities; and for coordination with neighbouring beats. They must also comply with Section 6 of the Forest Law of 2005, which requires satisfactory levels of woodland regeneration following any harvest of wood.

The police and National Nature Inspectorate have a legal right to inspect hunters in the field (to check licences, etc.), which may be delegated to Municipality (kommune) hunting monitors. Municipalities (kommuner) can require that harvested deer are brought to designated points for inspection.

Setting Harvest levels

Data on deer populations is collected centrally and maintained by the National Deer Register (www.hjortevilt.no) on a public internet database. This data, and the population plan submitted by the hunting rights owner, is the basis for determining harvest permit levels for each beat. Deer may not be hunted without a harvest permit.

Permits are issued by the Municipalities (kommuner) to the hunting rights owner, based on the tools available at the National Deer Register website, local consultations, and the population management plan for the beat submitted by the owner.

A population management plan for up to 5 years ahead (may be for a shorter period) is obligatory and can be for one or more (contiguous) beats. It must specify annual harvests (stags and hinds by age group), often in the form of a minimum % of younger animals and a maximum of older ones. The authorities must approve these plans, and in particular must ensure harvest levels are in accordance with local, regional and national population management goals. Approval can be withheld for not being compatible with, or withdrawn for failure to achieve in practice, these goals.

In the absence of an approved plan the Municipality (kommune) sets a harvest quota in accordance with local and regional and national population management goals.

Image: Hunting in Norway. Taking a meal break (Erling Solberg)

Using harvest permits

The owner of the hunting rights may use him/herself, give away, or sell any part or all of the permitted offtake in a free market. Typically, the sale of hunting rights is financially structured by the owner in a way that gives a strong incentive to achieve the required offtake, as the owner remains legally responsible for achieving offtake levels.

Reporting requirements

Each hunting beat must report annually offtake levels broken down by age and sex, within 14 days of the end of the hunting season. These are publically available in the National Deer Register.

The hunter individually must also, when required by the authorities, report the number, age, and sex of harvested deer; report total numbers of deer seen; and provide specified animal parts (typically one side of the lower jaw) for verification of harvest levels, population monitoring, and research purposes.

Training requirements

All hunters resident in Norway must pass a written exam on hunting law and regulation, reporting requirements, species identification, and firearms safety to obtain a hunter’s licence. They must also pass a test of shooting accuracy every year at an approved firing range.

Non-resident hunters may hunt if they can produce equivalent qualifications from their home country.

Image: Grouse shooting and fishing for char and trout (Erling Solberg)

Financing the system

To hunt in Norway a hunter must purchase an annual Hunter’s Fee Card from the central government. This is separate from any fees paid to the owner of hunting rights. Hunters also pay tag fees for each red deer harvested to the Municipality (kommune). There is no tag fee for roe deer. The revenue generated is dedicated to running the management system and to support local game promotional projects.

Norway is of course socially different to Scotland, and has had a different institutional history. Introducing a modern system of deer management would have to take this into account. However, the principle of managing a public resource for the common good through a democratically accountable system, on the basis of solid information on actual populations and on the population levels which will maximize that common good, and where landowners have the right to the offtake determined and the responsibility for achieving it, is fully transferable. A system attaining these goals and enjoying broad public support is achievable, and can be achieved.

A working example can be seen an hour’s flight from Scotland.

NOTES

(1) Moose were native to Scotland. It is probable that reindeer became extinct naturally, as suitable habitat is restricted for climatic reasons.

(2) There is a two tier system of local government in Norway in some ways analogous to the former Scottish Regional/District system. The powers at each level are more extensive than was the case in Scotland. Municipalities have an average population of 11,800 compared to 163,000 per local authority in Scotland.

Declaration of Interests, Income & Tax 2013

02. November 2014 · 4 comments · Categories: Announcements, Freedom of Information, Governance

SInce 2010, I have been ( like a couple of my self-employed writer/activist colleagues George Monbiot and Alastair McIntosh) making an annual declaration of interests, income and tax. Previous declarations can be found at the foot of the About page.

2013 INCOME

I ear my living from writing, research, consultancy, public speaking, investigation, and subscriptions from the whoownsscotland website. For 2013, my income was as follows.

GROSS INCOME (1) £ 32,485

LESS COSTS (2) £ 8,228

TAXABLE INCOME (3) £ 24,257

My total taxable income was £25,021 on which I am due to pay tax of £2,963.40 and Class 4 NI contributions of £1,485,18 = total of £4448.58 (see tax HMRC calculation here)

During 2013 all of my income was generated from within the UK. My main clients were NGOs, renewable energy companies, civic bodies, one political party (the Scottish Green Party), print & broadcast media and royalty payments on my books.

DECLARATION OF INTERESTS 1 JANUARY 2015

I own no land or property.

I have 483 shares in Standard Life.

I am on the Board of Directors of the Caledonia Centre for Social Development (Company No. 192099 & Scottish Charity No. SC 028485).

I am currently advising the House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee.

I am a member of the Scottish Green Party and a number of charitable bodies.

I currently provide ad-hoc unpaid advice to four political parties – the Scottish Green Party, the Scottish Labour Party, the Scottish Conservative Party and the Scottish National Party.

I do not make use of any tax havens or artificial accounting structures to conceal my income

NOTES

(1) Gross Income is the total of all income received. This includes re-imbursment for travel costs etc.

(2) Costs are all expenses such as computers, travel, stationery, telephone, research fees (for example, search fees paid to Registers of Scotland) and other expenses of employment.

(3) Taxable income is Gross Income minus expenses and is the profit figure on which tax is calculated.

Smith Commission

31. October 2014 · 15 comments · Categories: Announcements, Crown Estate, Democracy, Governance, Politics

I have not had the time to submit any very full-some submission to the Smith Commission on further devolution but I did send the following email today. I would also commend readers to the submission by the Scottish Trades Union Congress which is particularly sharp on the kinds of tools needed to develop a prosperous and fair society in Scotland.

Dear Lord Smith,

There are two specific powers which I would like to see form part of a further suite of devolved powers to the Scottish Parliament.

The Crown Estate

I have argued on many occasions that the Crown Estate Commissioners should have no role in Scotland. Evidence presented to the UK Treasury Committee, Scotland Bill Committee and Scottish Affairs Committee can be found here at the foot of the page.

The Crown Estate is a public estate and it’s administration and management should (like all other public land in Scotland) be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament.

This can be achieved by repealing Section 2(3) of Schedule 5 (Part 1) of the Scotland Act 1998.

Honours and Dignities

To promote a more equal Scotland it is no longer appropriate in my view that there be an official order of precedence in Scotland. I would like to see the abolition of almost all honours and dignities. Others may take a different view. To enable such a debate to take place, the system of honours and dignities should be devolved.

This can be achieved by repealing Section 2(2) of Schedule 5 (Part 1) of the Scotland Act 1998.

Thank you.

best wishes

Andy Wightman